




The UGent Institutional Repository is the electronic archiving and dissemination platform for all 
UGent research publications. Ghent University has implemented a mandate stipulating that all 
academic publications of UGent researchers should be deposited and archived in this repository. 
Except for items where current copyright restrictions apply, these papers are available in Open 
Access. 
 
This item is the archived peer-reviewed author-version of: 
 
Ernst Grosse and the “Ethnological Method” in Art Theory 
Wilfried van Damme 




To refer to or to cite this work, please use the citation to the published version: 
 
Wilfried van Damme (2010). Ernst Grosse and the “Ethnological Method” in Art Theory. 





Ernst Grosse and the “Ethnological Method” in Art Theory 
 
Wilfried van Damme 
 
 
Abstract: Intercultural and interdisciplinary approaches are today rightfully heralded as the most 
promising ways forward in the theoretical study of art and aesthetics. But that does not mean such 
approaches have not been considered before. In the late nineteenth century, the philosopher Ernst 
Grosse did just that, encapsulating his proposals in what he called the “ethnological method.” 
Moreover, he identified a series of predecessors who had either applied a cross-cultural perspective 
or drawn on various disciplines in examining art and aesthetics. This paper brings to light a 





Why are the Germans good at music, whereas the Dutch excel in painting? What are the reasons for 
the outstanding draftsmanship of Australian Aboriginals, and why does this skill seem absent 
among West African peoples, who appear concerned rather with sculpture? Could it be that the 
Japanese do not share the European preference for symmetry in decorative art? Moreover, why do 
tastes in the visual arts, music, and literature change so noticeably throughout history? Is it possible 
that, despite differences across time and space, there are features that each of humanity’s arts share?  
These are some of the questions that in the late nineteenth century were going through the 
mind of the German scholar Ernst Grosse (1862-1927). Trained as a philosopher, but influenced by 
the new natural sciences of his day, Grosse thought it possible to develop an approach that would 
answer such questions in a scientific manner. Key to his approach was the burgeoning field of 
ethnology. Ethnology would provide not only a method for tackling such questions but the 
empirical data on which the answers to these questions needed to be based. By drawing on 
ethnology, art theory would be able to transcend its eurocentric bias, abandon its speculative 
character, and get closer to the spirit of the natural sciences. 
Grosse outlined his views in an 1891 essay titled “Ethnologie und Aesthetik.”*1 The first 
part of this essay he devotes to a survey of previous attempts to have ethnology shine its light on 
questions in art theory. Leading him back to the early eighteenth century, this historical outline 
serves at the same time to introduce Grosse’s own views. The relevance of these views he then 
discusses in the context of the experimental aesthetics that was being developed in his own time. 
Grosse’s analysis draws attention to what I assert are overlooked ways of framing the study 
of art and aesthetics. The theoretical positions they propound are worth reconsidering for several 
reasons. For one, the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century views discussed below merit attention for 
their own sake, as developments in the history of European thought in the arts and humanities. An 
acquaintance with these views, moreover, may invite one to reconsider historiographic accounts of 
such fields as the philosophy of art, empirical aesthetics, and especially the anthropology of art and 
aesthetics. The disciplinary history of this last field now usually starts with late-nineteenth-century 
evolutionistic studies of ornament, or even as late as with the publication of Franz Boas's book 
Primitive Art in 1927.*2 Finally, what follows offers a historical overview of proposals for a global 
and interdisciplinary study of art and aesthetics at a time when an increasing number of scholars are 
again making such proposals.*3 
 
II 
Grosse begins by observing that ethnology has by now clearly proven its value to the humanities 
(Geisteswissenschaft). In whatever field they have been deployed (be it ethics, political science, or 
religious studies), the “treasures of ethnology” have so much enriched our knowledge and led to 
such a transformation of views that one might even speak of a Neubegrundung or re-foundation of 
the humanities. 
However, Grosse claims that one branch of the humanities refuses to consider ethnology’s 
data and approach. This branch is aesthetics, conceived as the theoretical study of the arts and their 
affective qualities. Aesthetics’ refusal is surprising, says Grosse, for two reasons. First, the benefits 
of ethnology, specifically the “ethnological method,” should be obvious to aesthetics particularly, 
he asserts. Second, the neglect is remarkable in that ethnology’s importance for the problems of 
aesthetics has been clearly pointed out by others long before. 
This acknowlegdment of predecessors leads Grosse to present a history of applying 
ethnological material and perspectives to questions in art theory or aesthetics. In this manner, 
Grosse historically grounds his enterprise for a contemporary audience he wishes to convince; he 
may even be said to create an intellectual ancestor gallery for his particular approach.  
Grosse begins his discussion with a contemporary scholar whose work he assumes his 
readers to be familiar with. Hippolyte Taine, he notes, is sometimes credited for having introduced 
the ethnological method into aesthetics. But whatever the merits of this French scholar in 
rejuvenating the discipline, this is not a fame he can lay claim to. Taine may have applied the 
ethnological method, but he was not the first.  
What does Grosse mean by the ethnological method? Today this label may evoke what 
anthropologists have come to call “participant observation.” The term is used to designate the basic 
methodological prescription of ethnography that scholars live and work among a given people, 
learning their language and trying to perceive the world through their eyes. As a professional 
ethnographic or anthropological practice, however, participant observation, or fieldwork, is 
basically a twentieth-century phenomenon. Embedded research by cultural outsiders, at any rate, is 
not what Grosse has in mind when he talks of the ethnological method.  
Grosse assigns two meanings to the ethnological method. First and foremost, it refers to the 
intercultural comparison of “peoples” or “nations,” both in space and in time. In addition, the 
ethnological method pertains to studying phenomena within their contexts or environments, 
composed of interrelated ecological, economic, and sociocultural factors. Grosse’s ethnological 
method, then, denotes the intercultural comparative study of contextualized data on a given subject. 
In order to understand Grosse’s discussion of the ethnological method in Taine’s work, one 
more observation needs to be made. As a legacy of twentieth-century practices, today we may tend 
to think of ethnology as the study of small-scale, traditionally oral cultures outside the West. Now 
for Grosse ethnology definitely includes the study of what for most of the twentieth century would 
be known as “primitive cultures.” Indeed, these cultures he sees as the real “treasures of ethnology.” 
However, the idea of ethnology being limited to these cultures was foreign to nineteenth-century 
scholars. Such a restricted conception emerged only in the early twentieth century, under the 
influence of colonialism especially.*4 Prior to that, ethnology included not only all extra-European 
cultures across space and time (whether small-scale or large-scale, literate or nonliterate) but 
European peoples or nations as well, both past and present. 
For Grosse, then, Taine deserves mention in the context of the ethnological method for two 
reasons. First, as prominently put forward in his Philosophie de l’art of 1865,*5 Taine formulated 
the “law” that every work of art is determined “by an aggregate made up of the general state of 
mind and the surrounding customs.” Taine’s law, with its Hegelian echoes, thus exemplifies in art 
theory the importance that ethnology attaches to sociocultural context. Second, Taine stressed that 
the laws governing artistic production can be uncovered only when one compares the art and culture 
of various periods and peoples. Taine’s intercultural approach, too, makes his work ethnological, 
even though he limited his comparisons to European cultures—fifth-century BCE Greece, fifteenth-
century Italy, seventeenth-century Holland, etc. 
These two dimensions of Taine’s work—the contextual and the intercultural comparative—
are to be applauded from a methodological point of view. But what Taine’s admirers overlook, 
writes Grosse, is that he basically repeats what Jean Baptiste Dubos had already proposed in his 
Réflexions sur la poésie et sur la peinture of 1719.*6 In this work, Dubos raised a question that 
according to Grosse constitutes one of the most important and difficult questions of aesthetics: Why 
does art flower among certain peoples and in certain periods, whereas in others it shows but a 
flimsy development? Dubos suggested that the peculiar character and achievements of each people 
depend on the quality of the air in their region. The presence or absence of talented artists among a 
given people he thus explained by reference to the local climate. Grosse admits that this is all 
“rather vague.” But more important to him is the procedure by which this suggestion has been 
reached: Dubos applied the “ethnological comparative method.”  
Moreover, it is observed that Dubos adopted this method in a much more extensive manner 
than did Taine. Whereas the latter limited himself to the “civilized nations of Europe,” his 
predecessor additionally considered not only Assyria, Persia, and Egypt, but India, China, Mexico, 
and Peru. Much as one may share Grosse’s enthusiasm for such an early and wide-ranging 
intercultural approach in art theory, it needs mentioning that he gets slightly carried away. For a 
closer inspection of Dubos’s work makes it clear that his references to the cultures mentioned are 
actually quite limited—Mexico and Peru, for example, each seem to be referred to only twice, 
China and Egypt a few times more, and Assyria is mentioned only once, in a nonartistic context 
(astronomy). Nonetheless, Grosse’s favorable comment on Dubos’s mention of these extra-
European cultures is suggestive of the spatiotemporal scope he has in mind when talking about 
intercultural comparison.  
Grosse then turns to Germany at the end of the eighteenth century to discuss a third and final 
predecessor, Johann Gottfried Herder. Grosse considers Herder the most diligent and eloquent 
advocate of “the idea of a comparative approach to the art and especially the poetry of all peoples.” 
Grosse highlights Herder’s emphasis on the diversity that becomes apparent when comparing the 
literary output of traditions from around the world. As in his discussions of Taine and Dubos, 
Grosse is especially interested in how Herder tried contextually to account for the intercultural 
differences in artistic expression, especially poetry. Referring to Herder’s Briefe zur Beförderung 
der Humanität (Letters on the Advancement of Humanity),*7 he draws attention to the following 
factors: the actual language in which a literary work is written (including its sounds), local customs 
and traditions, and temperature and climate.  
Grosse adds that Herder denounced looking down haughtily and ignorantly on the art forms 
of foreign peoples, and that he concluded by insisting that each artistic expression, literary or 
otherwise, be examined in the context of its time and place. These attitudes are very much in line 
with Gosse’s own orientation. In fact, there appear to be many correspondences between both 
scholars’ approaches to art and aesthetics beyond those hinted at by Grosse. They shared the view 
that aesthetic sensibility is a human universal (an idea not generally accepted in either Herder’s or 
Grosse’s days) and they both recognized cultural diversity in taste, seeking ways to explain it. They 
also shared an interest in the psychological and even physiological dimensions of aesthetic 
perception. More generally, Herder and Grosse alike resisted philosophical speculation and favored 
an empirical, bottom-up approach. In matters of art and aesthetics this stance involved close 
scrutiny of the artistic objects themselves.*8 
Despite his praise, Grosse feels compelled to conclude that, in the end, Herder was more 
concerned with the enjoyment of foreign poetry than its systematic study. Moreover, for all his 
attention to the art forms of various cultures, Herder is said to have undervalued the scholarly merit 
of what Grosse considers the most precious material that ethnology provides: the “aesthetic feelings 
and expressions” of the “lesser developed peoples.” Nonetheless, Herder so clearly pointed the way 
to ethnology that Grosse feels it very difficult, if not impossible, to explain why later aestheticians 
have refused to take it. 
It is true, writes Grosse, that in the eighteenth century the number of extra-European art 
objects at scholars’ disposal was limited, and the information that accompanied them less than 
trustworthy. Still, foreign art works were no longer rarities in this period. Did not Dubos mention 
already in 1719 that Europe seemed full of Chinese and other East Asian objects? The problem is, 
Grosse suggests, that the works of art increasingly arriving in Europe in the eighteenth century were 
accorded not enough scholarly attention to be properly documented; not even their provenance was 
usually recorded. Travellers for their part provided only scant illustrations and descriptions of 
foreign art forms. If only aestheticians had shown more interest, it is argued, the lack of information 
about extra-European art works would not have become such a lasting impediment to their study.  
Although Grosse has declared it almost impossible to explain why a Herderian turn towards 
ethnology was not forthcoming in art studies, at the end of his discussion of eighteenth-century 
developments he does briefly point to the intellectual influence of Herder’s near-contemporaries 
Johann Winckelmann and Johann Wolfgang Goethe. It is suggested that Winckelmann and Goethe 
were instrumental in re-establishing the idea that only one type of art was deserving of the 
admiration and serious study of educated minds: the art of Western antiquity. 
In the succeeding Romantic period a broadening of the horizon did take place, but the art of 
the “lesser developed peoples” was still not taken into account. Worse, according to Grosse, the 
Romantic spirit did not lend itself to serious scholarly work: “speculative fuddle” poisoned the 
minds of all kinds of scientist. But nowhere was this intoxication more lasting and damaging than in 
aesthetics, where scholars indulged in “mystical fantasies on the nature of art,” basing their 
reflections solely on examples of European high art. No progress was made in this period and even 
the achievements of previous scholars were forgotten. 
Here the empirically and interculturally minded Grosse meets his nemesis. The following 
quotation illustrates the vehemence with which he denounces the writings of Romantic 
aestheticians: “The speculative philosopher, from the heights of intellectual contemplation, where 
absolute beauty disclosed itself in a mystical glow, looked down with infinite contempt on the raw 
empiricists of the eighteenth century. Never have the words of aestheticians sounded so full as in 
this time, and never have they been so hollow. It was in all respects the most infertile period in the 
science of aesthetics, if in the face of these muddled and empty conceptual fantasies one can indeed 
speak of a science.”*9 Grosse does not mention any Romantic aestheticians by name, but he may 
well have had in mind such scholars as Karl Wilhelm Schlegel, who “had demanded that the 
reflection on art must itself become aesthetic.”*10 In Grosse’s The Beginnings of Art, it is the 
subsequent writings on art and aesthetics of Hegel, Herbart, and their followers that are dismissed 
as speculative. Rightfully “sunk into a common oblivion,” Grosse proclaims, their work “has to-day 
only a historical interest” (p. 3). 
 
III 
Things have indeed changed. Today, writes Grosse, speculation’s hold on scholarship has been 
broken, first of all by the revival of the natural sciences, which he feels has had a revitalizing and 
liberating effect on the humanities, including aesthetics. Grosse was not alone among late-
nineteenth-century scholars to herald the achievements of the natural sciences, to promote the 
application of their methods to humanistic topics, and perhaps even to try to partake of their 
increased prestige.*11  
In the case of aesthetics, Grosse observes, the reorientation of the field is owed largely to 
such natural scientists as Hermann Helmholtz and Gustav Fechner. Special attention is paid to 
Fechner’s Vorschule der Ästhetik (Elementary Aesthetics) of 1876, reporting on experimental 
studies in aesthetic evaluation.*12 Outside Germany, Grosse briefly mentions the efforts of the 
English biologist Grant Allen. He probably had in mind Allen’s Physiological Aesthetics of 
1877.*13 This is an early study in Darwinian or evolutionary aesthetics, which “argued that 
aesthetic feelings have a physical basis, are the product of natural and sexual selection, and thus are 
not unique to humans.”*14 In the context of these new developments Grosse mentions even Taine. 
Although not a natural scientist by training, Taine is claimed to have been the first to apply 
Darwin’s theory of natural selection to art history, and thus to have been firmly rooted in the 
modern natural sciences. 
Favoring a scientific approach, “modern aesthetics”—Grosse also calls it “empirical” or 
“positive” aesthetics—provides a powerful antidote to the older “speculative aesthetics.” In 
Fechner’s famous phrase, it seeks to establish an aesthetics von unten (from below) in opposition to 
an aesthetics von oben (from above). Grosse admits that the problems addressed by modern 
aesthetics are modest compared to those that speculative aesthetics thinks to have cleared up. But 
then the questions empirical aesthetics poses are at least solvable. This brings us to a 
methodological viewpoint that fundamentally informs Grosse’s work: Science must proceed from 
the simple to the complex; it cannot turn to more complicated issues if the relatively easy problems 
have not been solved first. As he will state in The Beginnings of Art, perhaps not coincidentally 
using an exact sciences analogy, “We have to learn the multiplication tables before we can solve the 
problems of higher mathematics” (p. 21). 
However, Grosse finds even modern aesthetics wanting in that it, too, fails to consider the 
“treasures of ethnology.” Grosse’s criticism may be illustrated by his discussion of Fechner’s 
Vorschule. This discussion also gives us the opportunity to broach a topic not yet addressed, namely 
Grosse’s conception of what counts as empirical in aesthetics.  
Fechner examined, among other things, the degree of visual pleasure afforded by various 
rectangular forms. For that purpose, he deployed one of three methods he proposed for experimental 
aesthetics, the method of use. This method examines works of art and other objects “on the 
assumption that the characteristics that are most commonly found in them will be those that win the 
most widespread approval in the society that has originated them.”*15 Fechner measured the width-
to-length ratio of various rectangular objects of everyday use, such as picture frames, books, and 
tables. He concluded that the ratio of these objects’ sides usually approximates that of the famous 
golden section, long held to have a special aesthetic value.  
Grosse wonders, however, whether Fechner’s conclusion can have the general validity it is 
suggested to have. For his examination is restricted to “the Western-European cultural sphere,” its 
objects supposedly designed to cater to its peoples’ taste. It would have sufficed for Fechner to 
measure the ratio of the sides of Japanese kakemono—vertical scroll paintings—to have learned that 
the golden section ratio does not apply in all cultures. But nowhere does Fechner suggest that 
experimental research take into account cultures outside Europe, and no one has performed a study 
that includes the aesthetic products of all the world’s peoples. Yet such comparative studies are 
obviously needed, Grosse claims, in order to avoid the trap of basing a general theory of aesthetic 
feeling on but one or a few cases worldwide. The message is clear: even modern aesthetics is still in 
need of the contributions that ethnology’s comparative method can provide. 
The intercultural comparative study Grosse has in mind should proceed along the lines of 
Fechner’s method of use, by examining objects from around the globe deemed artistic or aesthetic. 
The aesthetic feelings they are assumed to express—the local preferences they are held to 
embody—are then to be inferred from the objects’ visual properties. It is these objects and their 
features that Grosse considers the empirical material of his comparative approach. He never 
considers the possibility of applying Fechner’s other two methods, the method of choice and the 
method of production. These methods concentrate on people’s conveyed preferences and the 
aesthetic principles that guide them in creating visually pleasing objects, respectively. The methods 
thus focus on different types of empirical data and involve different procedures for producing them. 
When decades after Grosse’s proposals anthropologists of the fieldwork generation turned to 
examining aesthetic preference in extra-European cultures, they would proceed along the lines of 
these latter two methods, with an emphasis on people’s verbally expressed visual preferences.*16 
His critical historiography completed, and having aligned himself with the tenets of modern 
aesthetics, Grosse goes on to outline three crucial topics in art theory he feels can be properly dealt 
with only by using the ethnological method. These topics are the origins of art, and universalism 
and cultural relativism in art and aesthetics. Grosse’s discussion of cultural differences also leads 
him to return to the topic of the environmental or contextual factors involved in determining not 
only artistic taste but talent. 
 
IV 
The historian James Clifford once talked of “the expansive world of the late nineteenth century, a 
time of opening horizons—geographical, cultural, scientific.”*17 This spirit of openness permeated 
young Ernst Grosse’s cosmopolitan and optimistic views on future studies in aesthetics. 
Rejuvenated by the sciences in method and approach, and with philosophical speculation discarded, 
all that aesthetics needed to do now was shed its eurocentric bias (as Dubos and Herder had already 
suggested long ago) by turning to ethnology. Ethnology would provide not only empirical data (as 
he saw it) on extra-European cultures in time and space, but a contextual and intercultural 
comparative perspective that held the promise of explanatory power. The global and 
interdisciplinary approach to art and aesthetics that Grosse dreamed of, however, was not to be in 
his lifetime. It is only now being attempted anew in contemporary terms by a growing number of 
scholars.  
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